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Dan Price: Price began with a brief description of North American Free Trade Agree-
ment's (NAFTA) chapter 11, which is essentially a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) incor-
porated into a trade agreement. BITs create obligations relating to the treatment a country
must accord to foreign investors. Among the obligations typically in BITs: restrictions on
performance requirements, provisions on expropriation, and a requirement to provide the
international law minimum standard of treatment to foreign investors. One important as-
pect of BITs is that they provide a direct cause of action by the foreign investor against the
host state for a breach of these obligations in binding arbitration.
Price described the long history of BITs. There are over 1,000 BITs in place around the
world. The United States has numerous BITs and has had a BIT program in place for over
twenty years. As a major capital exporting country, the United States has a vested interest
in ensuring that U.S. firms are protected when they invest abroad, particularly in countries
that may not have a history of respect for the rule of law.
According to Price, BITs became controversial in the United States only over the last
few years, when Canadian investors brought claims directly against the United States under
NAFTA's chapter 11. These cases prompted some groups in the United States to question
the direct investor-state process and to question the standards of protection for investors
in the BITs-standards which the United States fought hard to help create.
As a result of these concerns, a debate ensued over the investment issue as part of the
Trade Promotion Authority legislation. In Price's view, there is no "there there." Investment
agreements like NAFTA's chapter 11 serve an important function for protecting U.S. in-
vestors. Most of the concerns raised about investment agreements are based upon claims
made by parties in cases that have not yet been ruled upon by the arbitrators. Price believed
that there is every reason to expect that arbitrators (often well-respected lawyers, academics,
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and jurists) will be able to throw out non-meritorious claims and provide appropriate in-
terpretations of the rules protecting foreign investors.
Howard Mann: Mann noted that the concern about investment agreements, which has
taken hold in the United States, has already been an issue in Canada for several years because
Canada already lost a number of prominent cases under NAFTA's chapter 11.
Mann stated that there will be increasing conflicts over investment agreements now that
they are mainstream and no longer obscure areas of law. The number of cases brought by
investors against states has drastically increased and investment agreements are now used
as a sword by multinational corporations to challenge government regulations. In the past,
these provisions were primarily employed only as a shield against egregious government
actions. Moreover, due to aggressive lawyering, the range of policy issues being addressed
in investor-state challenges is quickly expanding and an increasing array of domestic reg-
ulatory measures are being challenged. These aggressive claims are possible because the
standards in the investment agreements are often vague (for example, measure "tantamount
to expropriation" and "fair and inequitable treatment"), and the arbitration panels have at
times interpreted them surprisingly broadly. Foreign investors are using investment agree-
ments to bypass domestic judicial processes and going directly to the international arbitra-
tors.
Mann questioned whether the arbitration panels have demonstrated adequate deference
to domestic regulatory authority. In his view, many of the arbitration panels have come
down too strongly in favor of the rights of investors, extending the investment standards
beyond the limited role for which they were created. Mann also expressed concern that
these arbitration panels, often consisting of individuals with trade law backgrounds, incor-
porated principles of trade law into the unrelated field of investor protections. The result
in some cases (for example, the Ethyl and Metbanex cases) is that the investor-state process
was used to privatize trade law.
Mann also raised concerns over the lack of transparency in the chapter 11 cases. Arbi-
tration documents do not need to be made public, hearings are not open to the public, and
arbitration opinions must not be made public. The lack of transparency lends an aura of
secrecy to the process. Mann believed that greater transparency is a necessity.
Olin Wethington: Wethington focused on the investment negotiations in the Doha Round.
He noted that the Doha Declaration provisions on investments are not comprehensive, and
a high quality agreement in this area will be difficult to achieve due to a real reluctance to
accept meaningful agreements by countries like China and India. The United States needs
to be both principled and patient. Patience is essential because "no deal is better than a bad
deal." He stated that the United States needs to recognize the importance of global capital
flows and foreign investment. Rather than vague and undefined standards, a rich body of
law exists under investment agreements, which is mostly in accordance with the basic prin-
ciples from U.S. domestic law. Vhile chapter 11 might have flaws, the case has not been
made that it will undermine domestic regulatory rules.
Robert Stumberg: According to Stumberg, the debate over chapter 11 has only recently
been joined in the United States. Several models have been presented on how to deal with
the issue.
The first of these models is the Zoellick-Price Model. This model basically takes the
approach that nothing is wrong, meaning there is no need to fix chapter 11.
Another model assumes that something is wrong, but only because investment agree-
ments might provide greater rights to foreign investors than would be provided under U.S.
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law. This model, the Pax Americana Model, suggests taking U.S. law and applying it to
everyone.
Finally, the European Union Model uses the same standards as NAFTA's chapter 11,
without the direct investor-state process. This model retains the basic standards but allows
the State to take a greater role in shaping the jurisprudence, removing some of the anti-
democratic aspects of the current system.
Stumberg called into question the democratic legitimacy of investment agreements and
the direct investor-state dispute settlement process. He noted that through investment
agreements, foreign investors were able to challenge federal, state, and local regulatory
action and have these challenges heard by arbitration panels not elected or appointed
through democratically legitimate means.
Question and Answer Summary: The panel was asked whether the real problem was not
so much the investment agreements, as it was aggressive lawyering by international invest-
ment agreement "ambulance chasers" seeking to expand the investor protections in ways
never envisioned.
Olin Wethington stated that it seemed that for the cases cited most often as going too
far, the arguments used by the lawyers were mostly responsible for creating the problem.
Many of these cases will not be successful in the end. Robert Stumberg agreed with the
point that U.S. lawyers were bringing cases and making arguments that should not be
recognized by arbitration panels. Stumberg also argued, however, that textual problems
with chapter 11 (vague standards leaving much discretion to the arbitration panels) have
also helped to create the problem. Howard Mann disagreed that the lawyers were primarily
responsible. Mann laid part of the blame for the problems surrounding chapter 11 with the
judgments that have been handed down, many providing very broad interpretations of the
investor protections, for inviting further claims.
The recently-enacted Trade Promotion Authority bill includes an objective to provide
"no greater rights" to foreign investors than allowed under U.S. law, and the panel was
asked how congressional members would be able to test to see if that objective had been
satisfied.
Some of the panelists questioned whether it was appropriate to use U.S. domestic law
standards as a model for investment agreements, because in many cases discrete concepts
from U.S. law do not cover the same variety of circumstances and contexts that arise in
investment agreements (for example, "expropriation" may cover a broader array of circum-
stances than "takings").
Price argued that the current standards already are more or less consistent with U.S. law
and that for any claim under a BIT, a roughly analogous U.S. law claim already exists.
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